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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHNNY UDELL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20050453-CA 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of his residence? This court 
reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error but its application of law to fact is 
reviewed non-deferentially for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^  15, 103 P.3d 
699 (Utah 2004). Moreover, when consent to search is at issue, this Court "afford[s] little 
deference to the district court" in order to promote state-wide standards to guide law 
enforcement and prosecutorial officials. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, Tf26, 63 P.3d 650 
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Utah 1994), and State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 
1256, 1271 (Utah 1993)). 
This issue was preserved in Udell's motion to suppress (R. 44-49). 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Johnny Udell appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment of the 
Fourth District Judicial Court after the entry of guilty pleas conditioned upon his right to 
appeal the denial of a motion to suppress. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Johnny Udell was charged by information filed in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court on or about April, 20, 2004, with possession or use of methamphetamine, a 
schedule II controlled substance in a drug fee zone, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8; possession or use of marijuana a schedule I 
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controlled substance in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 58-37-8; and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of the Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5a. (R. 1-2). 
Udell waived his right to a preliminary hearing on October 12, 2004. (R. 42). 
Counsel then requested that this matter be set for a suppression hearing. The Court 
granted the request. Id. The trial judge found that there was sufficient probable cause and 
proper consent to allow the warrantless search. (R. 64-65). 
The suppression hearing was held on December 1, 2004. (R. 60). The Court denied 
Udell's motion to suppress. Id. On March 2, 2005 the State moved to amend counts one 
and two. (R. 87). The Court granted the request and count one was amended to illegal 
possession/use of controlled substance, a third degree felony. Id. Count two was amended 
to possession of < 1 oz. of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, and count three was 
dismissed. Id. On the same day, Udell entered into a conditional plea agreement, pursuant 
to State v. Sery, to the charge of a possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, and possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 84). 
On April 13, 2005 Udell was then sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. (R. 93). However, the prison term was 
suspended and based upon the defendant's conviction of illegal possession/use of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, Udell was sentenced to 60 days in the Utah 
County Jail. (R. 92-93). Udell was sentenced for another 180 days in the Utah County jail 
for his conviction of possession of < 1 oz. of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 92). 
On May 12, 2005, Udell filed a timely Notice of Appeal in the Fourth District 
Court. (R. 95). 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On March 26, 2004, American Fork police were dispatched to Johnny Udell's 
home to conduct a welfare check on Udell's son. (R. 48, 57, 67). As the police were 
speaking to Udell outside of his residence, Udell's girlfriend, Monica Auffhammer, came 
outside of the house and began smoking. (R. 48, 57, 66). The police instantly detected an 
odor of burnt marijuana from Auffhammer. Id. Both of the police officers were trained in 
drug detection and recognition, and one of the police officers was a drug recognition 
expert. (R. 55). They then began questioning Auffhammer because they believed that she 
was under the influence of drugs. (R. 48, 66). Auffhammer admitted that she and Udell 
had used marijuana within the past hour and that drugs and paraphernalia were on the 
premises (R. 66). 
Udell went back into his home as the police began questioning Auffhammer. (R. 
48, 66). The police then asked Auffhammer if they could search Udell's residence for 
illegal drugs. Id. Auffhamer gave them permission to enter Udell's home and search for 
illegal drugs. Id. 
Once the police entered Udell's home, Udell immediately demanded that they 
obtain a search warrant before searching his home. Id. The police ignored Udell's 
demands and continued to search his home in which they found several items of drug 
paraphernalia, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Id. The police officers then arrested 
both Udell and Auffhammer for possession or use of a controlled substance, two counts, 
and possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Udell asserts that the officers violated his constitutional right to be secure in his 
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home against unreasonable searches and seizures provided under the United States and 
Utah Constitution. 
Udell agrees that since his girlfriend smelt of burnt marijuana and also that she 
admitted that she and Udell had smoked marijuana within the last hour the police officers 
had probable cause to search his house. However, Udell argues that the State did not meet 
their heavy burden of proving that there were exigent circumstances which are required 
for officers to conduct a warrantless search of a residence. 
Furthermore, Udell argues that his girlfriend's consent to search his home was not 
a valid consent required for police officers to search his home. Udell argues that an 
ambiguous situation was created when he told the police officers to get out of his house 
and obtain a search warrant. Therefore, Udell argues that it was at this point that the 
police officers needed to obtain more information concerning whether Auffhammer had 
common authority over his home. Since the officers failed to obtain more information, 
Udell argues that an ambiguous situation existed and therefore it was unlawful for the 
officers to enter his home. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO, AND SEARCH OF, 
UDELL'S RESIDENCE WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMITTED 
BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
An individual is afforded the constitutional right to be secure in his or her home 
against unreasonable searches and seizures under the United States Constitution and the 
Utah Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Utah Const., art. 1, §14. "The right to be free 
free of unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the most cherished rights guaranteed 
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by the Utah and United States Constitutions." Brigham City v. Stewart, 2005 UT 13, \\5, 
— P.3d — (citing State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, ^ [21, 57 P.3d 1052). Furthermore, a 
"cardinal principle" derived from the language of the Fourth Amendment uis that 
warrantless searches 'areper se unreasonable" under that amendment. Id. (quoting 
Mincey v. Arizona, 431 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2048, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978) and Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). Moreover, 
Nowhere is this principle more zealously guarded than in a person's home, which 
is one of four domains expressly granted the security promised by the Fourth 
Amendment. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as 
"draw[ing] 'a firm line at the entrance to the house,'" Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 40, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 
445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)), where even "an 
officer who barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing" is deemed to have 
violated its venerable protections. Id. at 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038. 
S/<mw%2005UT13atTJ15. 
Udell asserts that the warrantless entry and search of his residence was 
unconstitutional under both the Utah and United States Constitutions and that all evidence 
obtained as a result of this illegality should have been suppressed. 
A. The warrantless search was not supported by probable cause and proof of 
exigent circumstances. 
In this case, the trial court found that "the odor or marijuana combined with 
Auffhammer's admission to recent use provided sufficient probable cause to search." (R. 
65). Udell argues that the trial court erred because a warrantless search of a residence 
requires more than the existence of probable cause. There must also be exceptional 
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circumstances "where 'the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that the 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'" Stewart, 
2005 UT 13 at [^16 (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408). In other words, for 
a warrantless entry or search of a residence to be valid, both probable cause and exigent 
circumstances are required. Id. (citing State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (Utah 
1987)). Udell asserts that the warrantless entry and search of his residence was not 
supported by exigent circumstances. 
On certiorari review in Stewart, the Utah Supreme Court noted that this Court has 
"correctly characterized exigent circumstances." 2005 UT 13 at ^|18. This Court in its 
opinion explained that exigent circumstances exist where a reasonable person in the 
officers' position would'"believe that entry was necessary to prevent physical harm to 
the officers or other person, [to prevent] the destruction of relevant evidence, [to prevent] 
the escape of the suspect,'" or to prevent the improper frustration of legitimate law 
enforcement efforts." Brigham City v. Stewart, 2002 UT App 317, f 8, 57 P.3d 1111 
(quoting State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993) (further citation omitted)). 
Furthermore, this Court stated that "the need for immediate entry must be apparent to 
police at the time of entry, and so strong as to outweigh the important protection of 
individual rights provided under the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
In Stewart, both Utah courts recognized held that although the officers saw four 
adults attempting to control a juvenile, and upon getting his hand loose the juvenile hit 
one of the adults, was not a sufficient exigent circumstance to allow warrantless entry into 
the private residence. 
In this case, the State has not shown-nor argued below-that the officers' entry into 
Udell's residence was necessary to prevent physical harm, to prevent the destruction of 
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relevant evidence, or to prevent the escape of any suspect. Stewart, 2002 UT App 317 at 
[^8. Accordingly, Udell asserts that the State has not met it's "particularly heavy" burden 
of establishing that the warrantless entry and search of his home was constitutionally 
supported by probable cause and proof of exigent circumstances. See Stewart, 2002 UT 
App 317 at 1J7. 
B. Police lacked proper consent to warrant entry of Defendant's residence. 
The trial court found that "Ms. Auffhammer is the defendant's live in girlfriend. 
She and the defendant, though not married, share a close relationship. She lives in his 
home and has complete access to the home. Therefore, Ms. Auffhammer having standing, 
"common authority" and sufficient connection to the premises possessed the authority to 
grant consent to search Defendant's residence without a warrant and without regard to 
Defendant's protest" (R. 64-65). 
Udell argues that the trial judge's ruling was in error because the State failed to 
prove that "at the moment" the officers entered his home they had enough information to 
determine Auffhammer had common authority over his residence. Udell further argues 
that an "ambiguous situation" was created when he told the officers to get out of his home 
and since an ambiguous situation existed the officers had a duty to make relevant inquiry 
into whether or not Auffhammer had authority to give proper consent. 
This Court in State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1998), examined the 
importance of information known to the officers "at the moment" they conducted the 
search. The Davis court also examined the issue of an "ambiguous situation." At issue in 
Davis was whether or not the officer had authority to search Davis' girlfriend's vehicle 
under the scope of a probation search. 965 P.2d at 531. The lower court stated that the 
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"central issue regarding the search of Hyatt's car was whether Davis had 'access and 
control over' the car." Id. In reviewing this issue, this Court focused on whether Davis 
had common authority over Hyatt's car. The court stated that "common authority to 
consent to a search rests ... on mutual use of the property by persons generally having 
joint access or control for most purposes." Id. The court further stated that a "showing of 
common authority requires 'persuasive evidence of both shared use and joint access or 
control."'A/, (quoting U.S. v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 864 (10th Cir. 1992). 
Furthermore, the "determination of consent... must 'be judged against an objective 
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment... 'warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the 
premises?" Id. at 533 (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86, 110 S. Ct. 
2793, 2800, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990)) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. 
Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). 
This Court also stated that it is the burden of the state to prove common authority 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The "[State's] burden cannot be met if agents, 
faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without making further inquiry. 
If the agents do not learn enough, if the circumstances make it unclear whether the 
property about to be searched is subject to 'mutual use' by the person giving consent, 
"then warrantless entry is unlawful without further inquiry." Id. (quoting U.S. v. 
Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (quoting Rodriquez, 497 U.S. at 188-89, 
110 S. Ct. at 2801 (emphasis added)). This Court held that the police officers failed to 
learn whether Davis had common authority over Hyatt's vehicle and, therefore, the 
warrantless search of the vehicle was unlawful. Id. at 533. The court found that although 
the officer had questioned Hyatt about drugs the officer 
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did not ask if any of the several vehicles present belonged to her or to third parties, 
never asked for her consent to search the home or any of the surrounding vehicles, 
and otherwise made no attempt to determine if any areas were outside of Davis's 
common authority and consequently beyond the scope of the probation search. In 
fact, not one of the testifying officers attempted to determine who owned or used 
the vehicles before searching them, even though several officers only knew Davis 
to drive the tan van. 
965 P.2d. at 533-34. 
In United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071 (C.A. D.C. 1991), the District of 
Columbia held that the "warrantless search of defendant's bedroom pursuant to mother's 
consent was invalid." The court stated that in determining whether a third party has 
authority to consent to a search the officer's "determination of the authority of a 
consenting party must be judged by 'the facts available to the officer at the moment...."' 
Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2801 (emphasis added), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21-
22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). The District Court of Columbia 
held that "as a factual matter, the agents could not reasonably have believed Mrs. 
Whitfield had authority to consent to this search. The agents simply did not have enough 
information to make that judgment." Id, at 1075. The court stated that "whether she had 
"mutual use" of the room or the closet containing the defendant's clothing could not be 
determined from anything the agents asked ... The agents never asked Mrs. Whitfield 
whether she cleaned her son's room, visited with him there, stored any of her possessions 
in the room, watched television there, or made use of the room at any time for any 
purpose.'5 Id. at 1074. 
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Udell argues that his case is similar to both the Davis and the Whitfield case 
because the State failed to show that "at the moment" the police officers entered his home 
they had enough information to determine if Auffhammer had common authority over his 
home. In fact, the State acknowledged at the suppression hearing that it was not known 
"exactly when they [the police] discovered that they [Auffhammer and Udell] were living 
together" (R. 98 at 2-3). 
Furthermore, Udell argues that when he yelled at the police officers to get out of 
his house and obtain a search warrant at the very least an ambiguous situation was created 
wherein the police officers should have stopped and found out whether or not 
Auffhammer had common authority to give consent to a search. The Davis court quoted 
the Whitfield court when they stated that "the [state's] burden cannot be met if agents, 
faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without making further inquiry. 
If the agents do not learn enough, if the circumstances make it unclear whether the 
property about to be searched is subject to 'mutual use' by the person giving consent, 
'then warrantless entry is unlawful without further inquiry"" State v. Davis, 965 P.2d at 
533 quoting United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1991)) (quoting 
Rodriquez, 497 U.S. at 188-89, 110 S. Ct at 2801 (emphasis added)). 
Accordingly, Udell argues that an ambiguous situation existed when he told the 
officers to get out of his home and get a warrant; and that the officers failed to obtain 
enough information as to whether or not Auffhammer had common authority over his 
home at the moment they entered and subsequently searched his home. Therefore, the 
entry and subsequent search of Udell's residence was unlawful because it was not 
supported by either exigent circumstances or proper consent. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Udell asks that this Court reverse the denial of his motion to suppress. Udell also 
requests that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instructions that 
he is granted leave to withdraw his guilty pleas, that all evidence obtained from the 
illegal entry and search of his residence is to be suppressed, and that the matter should 
be dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of October, 2005. 
Margaret |f. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 19th day of October, 2005. 
/ 
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ADDENDA 
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KAY BRYSON # 0473 
Utah County Attorney 
Jason Sant #9145 
100 East Center Street, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHNNY UDELL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 041401566 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This case is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence obtained as 
a result of a search of his residence. The State is represented by Jason Sant and David Stewart 
represents the Defendant. 
Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and submitted a memorandum in support of his 
Motion on October 21, 2004. On November 19, 2004, the State filed it's Response to 
Defendant's Memorandum. Finally, on December 1, 2004, this Court following argument and 
clarification by the parties made it's Ruling denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 26, 2004, American Fork police officers were dispatched to the 
residence of Johnny Udell, the defendant, to conduct a welfare check on his son at 
the request of the defendant's ex-wife. 
1 
2. While speaking with officers, the defendant's live-in girlfriend, Monica 
Auffhammer, exited the home. She smelled strongly of burnt marijuana and 
exhibited other signs of recent drug use. 
3. Officers asked to speak with her in private at which time Mr. Udell excused 
himself and re-entered the residence. 
4. The officers expressed their suspicions regarding drug use to Ms. Auffhammer. 
She became upset, cried, then admitted that both she and the defendant, Mr. Udell, 
had smoked marijuana within the past hour. Additionally, she admitted that more 
drags and paraphernalia were still on the premises. 
5. Officers asked for and were granted consent, by Ms. Auffhammer, to enter and 
search the home to retrieve all narcotics and paraphernalia she spoke about. 
6. Upon entering the home, the defendant, Mr. Udell objected to the officers' 
presence in the residence, demanding that they exit the residence immediately and 
secure a warrant. He became physically threatening and was subsequently 
handcuffed to ensure the safety of both defendant and officers. 
7. Ms. Auffhammer then assisted the officers in their search of the residence, 
directing them to various locations throughout the residence and it's curtilage 
where several items containing drugs and other paraphernalia were found. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
I. Probable Cause to Search. 
Probable cause existed sufficient to search the residence. Probable cause exists where the 
facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in 
the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 
(Utah 1986). The question is, then, did the officers have enough particularized and trustworthy 
information to give rise to the reasonable belief that an individual has committed or is 
committing a crime. 
When Auffhammer exited the residence she smelled strong of burnt marijuana. The 
officer, as a drug recognition expert, immediately recognized the odor. Moreover, after 
informing the woman of their concerns she admitted that she had used the drug within the past 
hour. 
The odor of marijuana combined with Auffhammer's admission to recent use provided 
sufficient probable cause to search. 
II. Consent to Search 
A third party may consent to a search of another's property if the third person has 
"common authority" over or a sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be 
inspected. U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). Co-inhabitants of a property assume the 
risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. State v. Davis. 965 
P.2d 525, 532 (Utah App. 1998). "Voluntary consent of any occupant of a residence to search 
the premises that is jointly occupied is valid against the co-occupant, permitting evidence 
discovered in the search to be used against him at a criminal trial." Matlock. 415 U.S. at 169. 
This is the case, even if the other party objects. 
Ms. Auffhammer is the defendant's live-in girlfriend. She and the defendant, though not 
married, share a close relationship. She lives in his home and has complete access to the home. 
3 
Therefore, Ms. Auffhammer having standing, "common authority" and sufficient connection to 
the premises possessed the authority to grant consent to search Defendant's residence without a 
warrant and without regard to Defendant's protests. 
ORDER 
Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court HEREBY 
ORDERS Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. 
Signed this ¥ day of <&flm*ry 2604 
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DAVID A. STEWART (10056) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Defendant 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(801)852-1070 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JOHNNY UDELL, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF 
Case No. 041401566 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
MOTION 
COMES NOW Defendant, JOHNNY UDELL, by and through his counsel of record, 
David A. Stewart, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and based upon 
the follow Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress, moves this court to suppress the 
incriminating evidence seized as a result of an illegal search and seizure. 
1 
MEMORANDUM 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. On March 26, 2004, police were dispatched to Defendant's residence to conduct a 
welfare check on Defendant's son. 
2. While police were speaking outside with Defendant at his residence, Defendant's 
girlfriend, Auffhammer, came outside and began smoking. 
3. Police instantly detected the odor of burnt marijuana coming from Auffhammer. 
4. Police began questioning Auffhammer believing that Auffhammer was under the 
influence of drugs, whereupon Defendant retired into his residence. 
5. Police requested that Auffhammer permit them to search the residence for illegal drugs. 
6. Auffhammer permitted police to enter the residence. 
7. Once police entered the residence, Defendant demanded that police obtain a search 
warrant before conducting any search of his residence. 
8. Police disregard Defendant's demands and continued to search the residence with 
Auffhammer. 
9. The search of Defendant's residence produced several items of drug paraphernalia, 
methamphetamine, and marijuana. 
10- As a result both Auffhammer and Defendant were arrested for possession or use of a 
controlled substance, two counts, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
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ARGUMENT 
POLICE VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY ENTERING DEFENDANT'S 
HOME WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT AND WITHOUT CONSENT 
OF DEFENDANT. 
An individual is afforded the constitutional right to be secure in his or her home against 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Utah Const., art. I, § 14. Therefore, a search of a person's 
home without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless there is probable cause and a recognizable 
warrant exception. State v. Trane, 57 P.3d 1052, 1058 (Utah 2002) (citation omitted); See also 
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992). 
A. Police lacked probable cause to warrant entry of Defendant's residence. 
Police entry of a person's home must be supported by either a valid warrant or probable 
cause that an offense is being committed along with a recognized warrant exception such as 
consent Brigham City v. Stuart, 57 P.3d 1111, 1112-13 (Utah App. 2002) (citations omitted). 
"Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the officer's] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or 
is being committed." State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986) (quoting Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)). Therefore, a police officer must have enough particularized 
and trustworthy information that gives rise to a reasonable belief that an individual has 
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committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. 
In the instant case, the police lacked probable cause to believe Defendant was about to 
commit a crime or was committing a crime. The most police had was that probable cause to 
believe that Auffhammer was committing a crime when police detected burnt marijuana coming 
from her person. Although further questioning of Auffhammer may have led police to believe 
that more controlled substances would be located within the residence if they were permitted to 
search the residence, police did not have anything more than reasonable suspicion. Therefore, 
police lacked probable cause to permit them to search the home of Defendant. 
However, probable cause alone is not enough to support warrantless entry of a home. 
Stuart, 57 P.3d at 1112-13. The State must also show that a recognized warrant exception exists. 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987); See also State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534 (Utah 
App. 1997). One such recognized warrant exception to the warrant requirement is consent to 
search. State v. Bisner, 37 P.3d 1073, 1087 (Utah 2001) (citing Washington v. Chrisman, 455 
U.S. 1 (1982); State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983)). 
B. Police failed to clarify the ambiguity of whether Defendant's girlfriend had 
common authority over Defendant's residence to give consent to search. 
Police can rely upon consent of a person who appears to have common etuthority or 
control over a residence to enable police to search that residence. State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 
533 (Utah App. 1998). However, "the State bears the burden of proving common authority, and 
it must do so by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 
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(Utah 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)). Moreover, "[t]he [State's] 
burden cannot be met if [police], faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed 
without making further inquiry. If the [police] do not learn enough, if the circumstances make it 
unclear whether the property about to be searched is subject to 'mutual use' by the person giving 
consent, 'then warrantless entry is unlawful without further inquiry.'" Id. Quoting United States 
v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal quotations omitted). 
In the instant case, police were dispatched to Defendant's residence to perform a welfare 
check. While police were at Defendant's residence checking on the welfare of Defendant's son, 
Defendant's girlfriend, Auffhammer, came out onto the front porch where police were 
questioning Defendant. Auffhammer proceeded to light a cigarette that seemed to police to 
produce the odor of burnt marijuana. The focus of questioning turned to Auffhamer based upon 
the suspicion that she was currently smoking marijuana. Defendant then retired into his home. 
Police continued to question Auffhammer about using illegal drugs in the home where children 
were present. Police then requested of Auffhammer to show them where all the illegal drugs 
were located inside the residence. Auffhammer permitted police to enter Defendant's residence. 
Upon entering the residence, Defendant instantly demanded that police obtain a search warrant 
before conducting any search of his residence. Police ignored Defendant's demand and 
continued on with Auffhammer who showed them where the illegal drugs were located. 
Because Defendant clearly demanded that police obtain a search warrant before 
searching his home gave rise to an ambiguous situation. Police were primarily relying on the fact 
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that Auffhammer had provided consent and had apparent common authority over the residence to 
give such consent. However, what made the situation ambiguous was that Defendant, who it was 
certain resided at the residence, demanded police to produce a search warrant before conducting 
any search of his residence. Instead of clearing up the ambiguity by inquiring whether 
Auffhamer had actual or common authority over the residence, police ignored Defendant's 
demand for a search warrant and continued with a search of Defendant's residence. This conduct 
of police violated Defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Therefore, the warrantless entry of Defendant's residence was unlawful without further inquiry 
of whether Auffhammer had common authority over the property to give consent to search the 
residence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons stated herein, Defendant submits that because police did not 
clarify the ambiguous situation, any and all incriminating evidence, including any derivative 
evidence, seized as a result of the unlawful warrantless search of Defendant's home must be 
suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1\^ day of October, 2004. 
DAVID A. STEWART 
Attorney for Defendant 
6 
